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COMMODITIES TAXES/LEVIES AND THEIR
EFFECTS ON COMMODITY TRADE AND
MOVEMENTS IN NIGERIA
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND OF COMMOD.
ITY MARKETING IN NIGERIA
Produce marketing in Nigeria falls into two broad categories, domestic trade in food items
which has always been handled
mainly by private operators, and
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the marketing of cash crops
which until July 1986 was handled

by Commodity Boards which
were monopoly public institutions.
While the prices of food items
were freely determined in the
market by the forces of supply and
demand, those of cash crops
underthe Commodity Board System were fixed by government.
The Commodity Boards were
noted for paying farmers prices
that were lower than the world
prices and sometimes even lower
than their production costs. This
difference represented implicit
taxation of farm incomes and
served as a dis-incentive to domestic production.
With the adoption of the

Structural Adjustment Programme in 1986, the Commodity
Boards were abolished and a free
market system was introduced.
This helped to eliminate the excessive implicit taxation of farm
incomes inherent in the Commodity Board System as the
prices of Cash Crops not only

converged with world market
prices but were further boosted
by the sharp depreciation in the
exchange value of naira. Pay-
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ments have also been very
prompt, and in some case prepaid, in the form of credit advances to farmers.

comparative advantage. The
trailer that carries kola nut from
Sagamu in the South West to
Kano in the North will on its return bring beans, tomatoes or

INTER/INTRA STATE COM.

cattle.

MODITY TRADING

However, the poor economic/financial base of many

The marketing arrangement

also created the free movement
of commodities within and across
states and regions by Commodity Merchant Traders and Buying
Agents. Albeit, introduction of
various commodities in Nigeria is
specific to ecological zones, climatic and soil conditions obtainable in various regions and
states, the marketing of the produce is done nationally, across
states and within local government areas. Since both industrial and domestic consumption
of the commodities take place in
all states on the Federation and
in the West African Sub-region,
there is active commodity trading
between states and localgovernment in crops which they have

state Governments, in adequate
reven ue allocation from federation
account, and the pressing need
to provide public goods for the
citizenry have always compelled

state governments to charge
taxes/levies on the marketing of
commodities in which they have
comparative advantage. Taxes/
levies are viewed as some of the
mechanisms for generating revenue internally, and for financing
government expenditures at all
tiers.
But the charging of different
amount of levies or taxes on each
tonnage of commodity traded
across states has resulted into
the problem of smuggling of produce by traders/merchants trying
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to evade high charges in producing states.
Consequently, some nonproducing states in certain crops
are found to record larger quantity of the commodity than states
with comparative advantage.
This paper therefore attempts to examine the administration of commodity taxesilevies
and their effect on commodity
trading in Nigeria. The rest of the
paper consists of four parts. Part
I assesses the various systems
of commodity marketing in Nigeria up to the introduction of economic reform programme in
1986. Part ll reviews the administration of various taxes and levies, while part lll examines the
effect of commodity taxes/levies

on Commodity Trade movements, Part lV, presents the conclusions and recommendations.
PART 1:

A REVIEW OF COMMODITY

MARKETING ARRANGE.
MENTS IN NIGERIA
Early attempts to formalize
produce marketing in Nigeria can
be traced to the 1930's when the
big European Companies such
as United Africa Company (UAC),
John Holt, Societe Commerciale
Occidentale Agency (SCOA),
Commerciale Francais Agencies
Occidentale (CFAO) and
Paterson Zochonis (PZ) were involved in direct purchase and export of Nigeria's major agricultural
commodities considered as essential raw materials for overseas
industries. However, government
involvement in organised commodity marketing dates back to
the second World War, when the
West African Produce Control
Board was established to stabi-
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lize commodity prices. This later

Thus, between 1979 and
1986 when the system was established, there were six com-

metamorphosed into four country-wide commodity marketing
boards, with responsibility for

modity boards in existence.

The Commodity Boards
Decree No. 29 of 1977 gave the

handling Nigeria's main agriculturalexport produce.
These were the Cocoa,
Palm Produce, Groundnut and
Cotton Marketing Boards. These
boards were restricted to domestic purchase of produce from
farmers within Nigeria, while overseas sales of the commodities
were handled by a private limited
liability company incorporated in
England in 1947 forthis purpose.
To reflect the regional character
of the country as a result of constitutional reforms, the marking
boards were changed into Regional Marketing Boards. The
boards were empowered to fix
producer prices forthe commodities they handled.
Commodity marketing then
went through two other major reforms between 1970 and 1980
(Ojo et 1995). The first reform in
1 973 resulted in the transfer of the

boards absolute monopoly to export the scheduled crops they
handled. The marketing of Nigeria's Scheduled Commodities thus
became the exclusive responsibility of the Federal Government.
By the end of 1985, it was

obvious that the Commodity
Boards could not carry out most
of their statutory functions satisfactorily or serve their intended
roles effectively. Consequently,
the Boards were dissolved in December 1986.
The dissolution of the
boards marked the fulfillment of
one of the cardinal elements of
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) i.e trade liberallzation. The fixing of producer/
guaranteed minimum prices by
government gave way to market
determined prices for agricultural
produce and ushered in a new era
of trade liberalization for agricultural commodities. Under this
system, individuals/farmers were
free to purchase and sell/export
all the hitherto scheduled commodities. ln addition, they were
free to keep their foreign exchange proceeds.

price fixing function of the regional

Marketing Boards to the Head of
State; who performed this function through the advice of an inter-ministerial Committee known
as the Technical Committee on
Produce Prices (ICPP).
The second reform was in

1977 when seven commodity
boards were established to replace the former all-purpose State

PART 2:

Marketing Boards. These were
Groundnut, Cotton, Palm Pro-

COMMODITY MARKETING
(TAXES) AND GOVERNMENT

duce, Rubber, Cocoa, Grains and
Tuber and Root Crops Boards.
The Tuber and Root Crops
board was later dissolved in 1979
and its functions transferred to
the National Root Crops Production Company.

FINANGES
The Structural Adjustment

Programme emphasizes the
need for state and local governments to increase the internal revenues above the existing levels,
through a combination of im-
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proved efficiency in revenue col-

by the Federal Government

lection from already existing

ranged between 10 and 20 percent. (Osakwe, 1971) while the
second, which was the produce
sales/purchase tax was imposed independently by the Regional/State Governments and
was assessed on the volume of
produce offered for sale to the
marketing boards. The rate
ranged between Nl per ton for
soya beans and N8 per ton for
cocoa beans. Revenue contributions from the two types of taxes
were substantial between 1960/
61 and 1969/70. Between,1960
and 1965, total revenue from produce taxation and capital grants
from marketing board averaged
Ff32 million ayeat (Ojo 1991). ln
the next five years, the average
contribution increased to Ft70.5
million a year. Thus, revenue
from produce taxation increased
from an average of 21.7 percent
between 1960 and 1965 to 47.3
percent between 1965 and 1970.
ln 1973, the first series of
reforms to the marketing board
system took place and the thrust
of the reforms was the abolition
of all forms of taxes on the export
crops underthe jurisdiction of the
boards. Thus, almost in one fell
swoop, the Regions/states lost a
vital source of revenue. But, even
if such taxes were not abolished,
revenue from these taxes could

sources, increase in the rate of
existing taxes and broadening of
revenue base by introducing new
taxes. Also macro economic instability heightened the need for
enhanced revenue balance.
ln most years between
1980 and 1997, inappropriate domestic policies and exogenous
shocks resulted in economic decline and deterioration in the finances of all tiers of government.
The Federal government's control
overthe budgetwas ineffective as
its budget deficit averaged 6.1
percent of GDP between 1980
and 1997 (Alade 1999). Foreign
debt rose from 3.7 percent in 1980
to 19.7 percent of GDP in 1997.

Large fiscal deficits, financed by

borrowing from the domestic
banking system led to acceleration in inflation.

COMMODITY TAXES
Apart from the fact that agricultural commodities were the
main sources of Nigeria's foreign
exchange earnings for a long time,
their output was also subject to a
number of taxes which became
important sources of government
revenue.
The lnstitutional arrangement by which these taxes were
administered was the marketing
board system underwhich statu-

tory marketing boards were
charged with purchasing the export crops from producers.

Two important types of
taxes were derived from commodity exports during the Commodity Board era. The first was
the export duty levied in proportion to the value of export. ln the
1960's, this export duty imposed

have dwindled considerably given
the drastic Cecline in the production and export of the crops involved. Revenue from the export
taxes could only have been maintained or increased by increasing

the rates exorbitantly and this
would have increased the disincentives to producers.
After the dissolution of the
Commodity Board System, the

government through the Export
Commodities Coordinating Committee (ECCC) established the
Administrative Commodity Exporl
Levy of $5 per tonne for cocoa
and US $3 pertonne for any other
agricultural commodity that is exported out of the country. The reason government gave for the establishment of these levies was
that the levies would be utilised
to service Nigeria's membership
of lnternational Commodity Organisation. The government also
posited that the benefits derivable
from attendance of these meetings was enjoyed by the private
sector and it was thus expedient
for the private sector to fund the
activities of the ECCC.
Following closely at the
heels of the export levies were
state government produce taxes
and levies on the commodities
produced in their territories. Grading fees was expected to be harmonized across the country for
various crops. However, most
states do not comply with agreed
rates insisting that these commodities were revenue earners for
the states and as such should
be charged accordingly. For instance the fixed rate for grading
a tonne of cocoa is about N5 per
tonne, but some states charge as
high as N18,000 for grading of
cocoa. This divergences in grading fees and levies have their consequences which are discussed
in the next section of the paper.
PART 3

EFFECTS OF GOMMODITY
TAXES/LEVIES ON COMMOD.
ITY TRADE MOVEMENTS
The role of internaltrade in
the domestic economy is analogous to that of trade in the world
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economy. Countries trade among
themselves to obtain goods and
services, which they need but
which cannot be produced within
theirboundaries. Similarly, states
within a country exchange commodities through trade so as to
obtain crops/com modities, which
they cannot produce in their localities. As a matter of fact, internal
trade within an economy tends to
assume a greater role than inter-

national trade in the world
economy because of the fewer

restraints in the domestic

economy. Due to high degree of
integration within a domestic
economy, regions do not have to
attain self

-
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sufficiency at any cost

(as may be the case with countries). On the account of this
greater interdependence among
regions/states, unrestrained internal trade can be relied upon to

satisfy the demands of various
regions.

However, with the imposition of grading fees/levies and
commodity taxes, by various
states/regions afterthe era of the
commodity/Marketing Boards,
trading within the country has become restrained.
It has been observed that
movement of commodities from
one state to another has become
rather difficult with transporters
having to face several check
points mounted by state produce
officers who impose their levies
on the commodities being transported. The effect of this is the
inflated prices of the commodities
forthe ultimate consumer as well
as scarcity of some commodities
in states with high tax rates.
Records have shown that
most merchants in both domestic and international commodity

trade avoid the payment of levies
and taxes. The evasion of taxes
and levies have the following effects on commodity trading as
wellas state and nationaleconomies.

(a)

Unrecorded Trade
ln order to avoid the payment of taxes and levies, many
traders collude with designated
enforcement agents to smuggle
commodities across state borders. The result of this action is
that some states that do not produce a particular commodity now
record higher trade volumes for
these commodities as against
states that have comparative ad-

vantage of producing such

a

commodity. For instance, cocoa
is not produced in Benin Republic, however, Benin records some
volume of cocoa exports which
are normally smuggled through
Nigerian borders into the country.
Cocoa traders who do not want
to pay the ECCC export levy and
the state government produce
sales taxes, smuggle their cocoa
beans to Benin Republic. This
situation has led to reduction in
Nigeria's cocoa exports while
Benin records exports of a commodity it does not produce.

(b)

Low lnternal Revenue
Unrecorded trade usually

translates to low internally generated revenue for producing states
and for the country in general.
Large proportion of the revenue
expected by the government from
produce sales taxes and other
levies, are not usually received as
a result of the activities of merchant who either smuggle the

commodities across state/national borders or collude with en-

forcement agents to evade payment of thesetaxes/levies. Also,
foreign exchange that could have
accrued from the export of these
commodities is lost to neighbouring countries, the recipients of
smuggled produce.

(c)

Low Quality of Traded
Commodities
ln attempts to evade payment of taxes/levies a large proportion of produce do not pass
through required standard quality
tests before entering the market.
This has led to the trading of commodities that do not meet both

local and international quality
standards. For instance, during
the era of the Commodity Boards
when cotton was traded in cotton
gazetted markets, the quality of
cotton produced in Nigeria was
high because the cotton was inspected at these markets for quality control before being sold to
ginneries. However, since the liberalisation of trade, cotton traders
do not subject their cotton to quality test and as such most cotton
that get to the ginneries contain
stones, water and other impurities. The same goes for Nigerian
Cocoa which used to enjoy premium price at the international
market in view of its high quality
during the Marketing/Com modity
Board era. Since the advent of
liberalization, the quality of Nigerian cocoa has dropped so much
so that our cocoa is now discounted in the international market.

EFFECT OF DIVERSE GRAD.

ING/PRODUCE FEES ON
GOMMODITY TRADE
Different rates of grading/produce
fees charged by states have con-
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stituted a disincentive to inter
state commodity trade. Grading/
produce fees are supposed to be
uniform all over the country for the
various commodities. However,

most states have refused to
charge the harmonized fees
passed to them by the Technical
Committee on Agricultural Produce (TACP). The major reason
given for this action is that these

commodities are their

main

sources of revenue and as such,
they have to capitalize on them.
For instance Produce lnspectors

in the cocoa producing states
metsometime ago and fixed the
sum of fr+5,000 pertonne as produce fees for inspection of cocoa.

Some states have however refused to implement this rate and
have rather increased theirs,
some up to as much as Ft18,000
pertonne.
The lack of uniformity in produce levies/fees has thus led to
commodity merchants evading
produce inspection in such states
and carrying theirprodu@ across
the borders to other states or outside the country. This has thus
led to most produce leaving the

state/country un-graded and
thereby creating quality problems
for Nigerian cocoa in particular
and produce in general. This

problem atso creates artificial
scarcity of some produce in areas with high tariff regimes as
against areas with low rates, as
well as very high price differentials from one state to the other.
PART !V:

CONCLUSION AND RECOM.
iIENDATIONS
This paper has attempted
to discuss the evolution of organised commodity trade in Nigeria

as well as the coming into being
of commodity taxes and levies in
commodity trade.
Commodity trade, in Nigeria began with the British companies exporting raw materials to
their industries abroad. His was
followed by the Commodity/Marketing Board era and finally trade

of smuggling of our produce
across our borders.

(ii) The Technical Committee

tee set up to keep surveillance

on commodity movement
produce, levies and taxes
should intensify its efforts at
harmonization/unification of
produce levies/taxes across
the length and breadth of the

liberation. CommodityTaxes/
Levies started during the days of
the Commodity/Marketing Board.
However, the effect of these taxes
and levies was not very adverse
during this era in view of the fact
that the Commodity Board handled the purchase and sale of
these commodities and also paid
the levies.
Since the abolition of the
Commodity Board System, taxes
and levies on produce had taken
a new dimension. States have
used these taxes/levies as major
sources of revenue and as such

country.

(iii) State governments should as
much as possible keep within
the limits of rates approved by
State Produce Director and
ratified by the TCAP.
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